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Abstract: 
Recent debates in economic sociology have raised questions about the significance of law in 
the economy, and specifically the role of law in the operation of markets. This paper compares 
a recent grand and detailed historical sweeps of the laws of the labour market by Deakin and 
Wilkinson with an ideally complementing similar two volume study of the history of taxation, 
also related to the labour market, by Daunton. By exploring the differences between the 
evolution of legal, fiscal and welfare institutions, this paper aims to cast light on the processes 
of institutional change that neither, taken separately, were able to undertake. 
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“The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the 
deeds its policy may prepare – all this and more is written in its fiscal 
history, stripped of all phrases. He who knows how to listen to its message 
here discerns the thunder of world history more clearly than anywhere else.”  
 
Joseph Schumpeter, ‘The crisis of the tax state’, International 
Economic Papers, no 4., p.7. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent debates in economic sociology have raised questions about the significance of law in 
the economy, and specifically the role of law in the operation of markets (Swedberg, 2003; 
Greif, 2000; Nee and Swedberg, 2005; Fligstein, 2005). The above Schumpeter quotation 
suggests also that fiscal regulation plays such a central role in economic development that 
ignoring its message would mean letting the thunder of world history pass by unnoticed. A 
recent publication providing a grand and detailed historical sweep of the laws of the labour 
market by Deakin and Wilkinson (2005) now ideally complements a similar, slightly less recent 
completion of a major two volume study of the history of taxation, also related to the labour 
market, by Daunton (Daunton, 2001, 2002, see also Daunton, 1995). Both these works adopt 
an explicitly evolutionary explanatory framework, even if their formulations of it differ in 
important respects. Although their approaches will be more thoroughly explored later, they 
each have a conception of the evolutions of law and fiscal regulation respectively as specific 
sources of variation in adaptive interaction to a changing economic environment. 
By comparing their accounts, and in particular, by exploring the differences between the 
evolution of legal, fiscal and welfare institutions, this paper aims to cast light on the processes 
of institutional change that neither, taken separately, were able to undertake.  The paper 
unembarrassedly takes advantage of the immense labour of others, therefore, as a second 
order analytical operation. It benefits from their richly detailed historical accounts, and 
necessarily involves considerably more systematisation of empirical data than is present in the 
originals. In so doing, the purpose of this paper is to indulge in a kind of empirical 
experimentation, bringing to the foreground four primary poles of evolution, economy, 
employment contract law, ‘welfare’ law, and fiscality. It does so in relation to labour markets, 
but hopefully the implications drawn from it would be equally beneficial for the analysis of 
other legal, fiscal and economic fields. This exercise in relation to labour markets is partly 
facilitated by a ‘long duration approach’ made possible precisely because labour has been 
continuously bought and sold over the long historical period from before the industrial 
revolution through to the present, although the main focus of this analysis will be the two 
centuries from 1750 to 1945. Consequently, it affords us with the opportunity to explore the 
co-evolution of economic, legal, and fiscal arrangements in relation to the operation of markets 
in ways not so readily available for other types of market (Harvey and Metcalfe, 2004). 
Although there are many characteristics peculiar to labour, as against product or capital, 
markets, nonetheless it is hoped that this analytical empirical-exercise will be of broad interest 
(Harvey, 2002). It certainly has been useful to us, for example, when considering the evolution 
of forms of economic organisation and transformations of laws of intellectual property in 
biological knowledge markets in the late twentieth century. But it is the sheer scale and scope 
of their works that provides strength to the analytical-empirical experimentation. 
From this comparison reviewing two parallel evolutionary accounts, however, a second but 
equally important line of argument naturally emerges. By understanding the specificities and 
differences between different forms of, broadly, regulatory systems on the one hand, and 
economic transformations on the other, we can raise some sharper questions about concepts 
of the embeddedness of economies in non-economic institutions, and indeed develop further 
an analysis of what is meant by institutions, as against norms, or rules, formal and non-
formal. The concluding part of the paper will therefore deploy the lessons learnt from the 
comparison to advance the critique of the concept of embeddedness, and develop an approach 
that recognises the specificity and interdependency of processes of economic, legal, welfare, 
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and fiscal institutionalisation. Specificity of, and interactive interdependency between, these 
four poles in our experimental model suggests that the explanatory language of co-evolution 
or open-systems causality may be more appropriate. 
2 EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES 
Deakin and Wilkinson have developed a distinctive perspective for understanding historical 
changes in formal laws. Distancing themselves from game-theoretical views (which can be 
exemplified by Greif, 2000) in which law is endogenously emergent from repeated economic 
moves of rationally calculating economic actors, they stress the need for both the distinction 
and interdependence between implicit norms and formal legal instruments.1 Foregrounding the 
analogy between biological and social evolution, law is seen as a formal coding of information 
derived from the wider social world. This coding into legal concepts is the necessary manner by 
which information is reproduced over time – inherited, so to speak. Moreover, the very fact of 
a relative closure of legal systems – ‘their partial separation from the social and economic 
realm’ – is a condition for their acquiring legitimacy. Recognising that this separation of a 
formal realm of law is not a universal phenomenon, but itself a result of historical 
differentiation, it can never be absolute.  
This characterisation of formal legal codes as a distinctively coded conceptualisation, however, 
forms an essential part of their co-evolutionary explanatory model. For, it means on the one 
hand that legal codes have their own modes of inheritance (reproduction), but also their own 
patterns of variation, legal innovations arising from passing new laws or making new 
judgements, that entail specifically legal modes. These new variations are then subject to 
pressures of selection, from the economic and political environments which they inhabit. The 
model thus proposes a toing-and-froing: new information from the external world is 
assimilated (op. cit. p. 31), and distinctively transformed, by formal legal processes of coding, 
heavily reliant on existing conceptual codes, before becoming new law, which in turn is 
subsequently selected for by the very information environment from which it emerged. Finally, 
by virtue of this toing-and-froing between two poles whose dynamics differ, there is no 
equilibrium point, and ‘the process of legal change…is indeterminate and open-ended.’ 33. 
In their concluding reprise of their co-evolutionary model, they further develop their 
framework in counterposition to a Hayekian conception of exogenous law, as a preconditional 
architecture on the one hand (contract, property rights, etc.), coupled with emergent 
spontaneous order, manifest in the formation of informal norms evident in much market 
behaviour (Sugden, 1989). For Deakin and Wilkinson, such a model blocks the feedback loop 
between formal law and economic transformation, leading to a rather static view of formal law, 
and an underestimation of its economic significance. If market order was left to endogenous 
spontaneous rules, there was a likelihood of strong path dependencies around existing norms, 
making them inadaptable, and to leading potentially to pathologies of the market, not with 
respect to some ideal neo-classical market, but with respect to pragmatic, and political 
improvement. A legal view from a distinctive, not directly economic-participative, perspective 
gives scope for policy interventions. In this way, legal innovations may act as a corrective 
particularly to those barriers to the development of personal capabilities permitting full 
economic functioning, especially barriers of self-reinforcing inequalities and market 
segmentation. As against Hayek, there is therefore scope for policy intervention, without 
making claims to all-seeing, perfect information, that in turn becomes part of the ongoing co-
evolutionary process of legal reformation and economic transformation. 
Although this is not a point they themselves raise, effectively they distinguish between broadly 
the historical development of body of law concerning the employment relation or contract, on 
the one hand, and the parallel development of law concerning ‘welfare’ and the duty to work, 
on the other. For the purpose of a systematic comparison, it is worthwhile distinguishing these 
two strands for their different modes of interaction with the economic ‘environment’. Although 
                                           
1 The premier historical example of emergent law was the lex mercatoria, a body of codes of contract, rules of 
exchange, and property rights that emerged in trading communities during the early middle ages, partially 
independently of the state, although often relying on state powers for enforcement (Swedberg, 2003; Weber, 1978; 
Greif, 1989, 2000.) 
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in many instances they overlap, and the boundaries between them are quite fuzzy, the former 
relates to the classification of work relationships, between, for example master and servant, 
employer and employee, whereas the latter especially concerns the changing duty to work, or, 
in other words, how the constraints to sell labour on the market have been historically 
constructed. This second strand is distinct both in that it defines who is included and excluded 
from the labour market, and in that it immediately involves the allocation of economic 
resources mobilised by the state (central or local), whether for the construction of workhouses, 
or for the provision of some form of welfare benefits (for example, outdoor relief). In this 
respect, this second body of law engages differently with its economic environment, from the 
first, and hence may be explored for its different evolutionary trajectory. The rationale for 
treating them separately, as we shall see, is that they can well be out of “synch” with each 
other, as much as with the economic selection environment. 
With a shift in field of state intervention in markets, there is a shift in evolutionary 
perspectives. Daunton regards taxation as the construction of a necessary consent for 
resourcing collective projects over and above individual interests, and for the purposes of this 
paper, in particular the role of the state in securing the necessary conditions for the operation 
of a capitalist market economy. A two-way trust, a form of social contract, between state and 
people is required whereby there is sufficient consent over collective purposes undertaken by 
the state to engender both people’s trust in the state and the state’s trust of the people, so 
minimising the need for enforcement and coercion. This is therefore not predicated on any 
fundamental assumption of antagonism between the individual and the collective interest. 
Although much less explicitly framed, the changing conditions of achieving trust are expressed 
in markedly evolutionary terms. There are four components to the perspective. Firstly, there 
are distinctive designs for assessment and collection of taxation revenue – internal logics of 
fiscal systems – subject to processes and rhythms of state budgeting. This can be taken as the 
fiscal equivalent to legal codes, and has a similar process of social categorisation, defining and 
operationalising target groups for taxation – landowners, salary earners, foreign traders, etc. 
As we will see, this means that tax categorisations and legal and welfare categorisations may 
intersect and conflict. Second, any taxation system needs to find a fiscal ‘handle’ on the 
economy, in terms of forms of income or types of economic activity, such as rent from 
agricultural land, profits from trade, consumption of goods and services, or, in the case that 
particularly interests us here, exchanges between engagers and sellers of labour. These 
handles are attached to various forms of economic organisation, liable to change, an 
environment therefore that selects for appropriate handles. Well-established and routinised 
taxes enter into normal calculations made by economic agents in their calculations of prices 
and profits – “old taxes are no taxes” – becoming constitutive of economic activity. Thirdly, 
changes in either states’ needs for revenue raising or in patterns of economic activity lead to 
partial or radical mis-alignment between fiscal systems and the economy. Daunton cites the 
example of regular waged employment developing in such as way as to ‘offer’ a new historical 
handle for taxation during the early twentieth century (Daunton, 2001, 14). Constant 
processes of variation in tax systems result in interactions with the economic environment, 
ranging from fine tuning of adaptation, to radical change. Developing Bonney’s (1995a, b) 
concept of a fiscal constitution, moments of major historical crisis require major structural 
change in fiscal systems. Fourthly and finally, the character of state expenditure can also alter 
– for example, from being primarily a fiscal-military state typical of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, to assuming responsibility for expenditure on education, health, or 
economic public infrastructure. These expenditures in effect are the obverse side of the fiscal 
contract between state and people, according people rights to resources acquired by the state, 
and creating new social divisions or integrations between ‘the public’ and sub-groups within it. 
This in turn provides a central, and additional, selection environment for taxation, political 
processes that ensure the consent of the taxed in return for their rights over public resources. 
A critical aspect of this second, but not secondary, environment has clearly been the expansion 
of the suffrage, institutionalising the link between taxation and representation. 
What each of these perspectives share, is that legal, fiscal, or welfare rule systems involve 
categorisations of the population, fundamentally, I would argue, in terms of rights over 
resources, whether secured through market transactions or through non-market 
arrangements, such as entitlements to welfare, or to public goods. In this paper, the focus will 
be limited to how each of these systems categorise the parties to the employment relation – or 
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exclude them from it; and how they each interact with, condition, and impact on the 
organisation of buyers and sellers of labour, the constraints and incentives to exchange, the 
pricing mechanisms, and the ‘rights to (labour) resources and their outputs’, property rights. 
If, accordingly, we examine the ‘architecture’ of the organisation of exchange involved in the 
formation of labour markets, it is possible to envisage a purely economic description, and, 
indeed, an analysis in terms of economic institutionalisation of each of its aspects, without any 
role for formal rule systems. At the opposite extreme, the very same economic aspects can be 
seen to be instituted by various possible combinations of legal, welfare, and fiscal rules.  These 
rules have, it can be argued, different handles on each or several of the aspects of the 
organisation of exchange, one variant of which is displayed in the table, a variant which does 
in ways that will be shown, correspond with phases of the history in question. In this case, 
capitalist labour markets – or markets in general – could be portrayed as analogous to playing 
games according to rules, with the important proviso that different national legal systems 
prevent nations from competing under comprehensively shared rules. Formal rules give ample 
latitude for different strategies, individual agency, within the framework of the game. 
However, once an evolutionary perspective is taken, and the question of how rules change is 
posed, neither of these two extremes appears adequate, and we are forced to seek, dare it be 
said, a third way, in an evolutionary form of explanation. The evolutionary framework can 
therefore be tested by exploring how the respective systems of categorisation changed over 
time in relation to their shared selection environment, the economic organisation of the 
employment relationship. 
 
 
FORMAL 
RULES 
 LAW 
WELFARE 
FISCALITY  
LAW   
WELFARE 
FISCALITY  
(LAW) 
 
FISCALITY  
LAW 
OF QUALITY 
STANDARDS 
LAW  
 
 
ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS  
Formation of 
parties to 
the 
exchange 
into sellers 
and buyers 
Organisation 
of the 
parties: 
firms, skill 
groups, 
professions, 
unions, etc. 
Constraints 
and 
incentives to 
exchange 
Price 
mechanism 
Defining what 
is exchanged 
– 
qualification, 
branding 
Property 
rights - 
contract 
Table 1: Possible articulations between formal rules and economic institutions 
3 COMPARING ASYNCHRONIES AND TRAJECTORIES 
The extended table below identifies the main changes in economic organisation relevant to 
employment, and aligns these to changes in legal frameworks, “welfare” law, and taxation 
rules related to the wage and employment. Read vertically, the table marks the key turning 
points for each of the four domains, while read horizontally, the synchronies (visible in clusters 
of regulatory changes), and asynchronies between the trajectories come into focus. Looked at 
on the most global level of generalisation, however, it could be argued that by the time 
following the second world war, finally, and after an extended history, a nexus had emerged of 
employment relation and a correlative wage form institutionalised in economic organisation, 
law, welfare and taxation. That is to say, this nexus was the outcome, rather than the 
precondition, of industrial capitalism. Again, staying at this most global level, there is evidence 
of some level of mutual adaptation and coherence between the four poles of transformation. 
Yet a synchronic, horizontal analysis of the empirical evidence reveals just how contrasting, 
even conflictual, the relations are between the poles during any given historical phase. An 
analysis of the dynamics of their interactions sheds some light on processes of evolutionary 
change. 
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Date Economic organisation Employment law ‘Welfare’ law Fiscal constitution State expenditure 
 Labour Firms    % GDP  
1700 Increasing wage 
dependency – 
rural. 2/3 of 
working 
population. 
Annual 
settlement by 
hiring servant v. 
cash wage 
labourers 
 [1562 Statute of 
Artificers, 1631 Book 
of Orders and 
Directions – 
corporative control, 
wage fixing minima 
and maxima]. 
1747, 1777, 1798 
Master and Servant 
Acts. Criminal and 
magistrate regulation 
of labour. Division 
between servants and 
contractors. 
[1601 Poor Relief 
Act – only country 
in Europe to have 
a national 
integrated system 
of poor relief. 
Settlement Acts 
1662, 1693, 
1697] Restrained 
charity 
Rates on property owners 
Customs and Excise duties 
Taxation 
8-10% 
 
1750 Internal 
contracting 
Disappearance of 
wage fixing. 
 
Growth of 
‘exceptive hiring’, 
not linked to 
settlement 
Absence of 
unified 
managerial 
control: 
ownership 
combined 
with control 
  
 
1782 Poor Relief 
Act establishment 
of workhouses for 
non-able, 
excluding idle poor 
from relief. Relief 
7x level of France. 
1795 
Speenhamland 
Minimum wage 
guarantee indexed 
to prices 
   
1800 Piece rates linked 
to internal 
subcontracting 
 
Sub-
contracting: 
family; 
master- 
Combination Acts 
1799/1800 abolition 
of wage fixing for 
most manufacturing 
Supplementary 
wages; 
compulsory labour 
on subsidised 
Emergence of the ‘fiscal state’, 
combining taxation and 
National Debt. 
 
1810, 
23%. 
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Emergence of 
salaried middle 
class 
servant; 
gang 
trades 
1813/1814 Repeal of 
Statute of Artificers – 
wage 
fixing/apprenticeship 
control of market 
entry 
Combination Acts, 
1824/25. 
 
1834 Poor Law 
Amendment Act. 
Abolition of 
settlement by hiring 
1844/1856 Joint 
Stock Acts 
1852 Todd v Kerrich – 
reinforcement of 
distinction between 
servant and salaried 
status employees 
(governess) 
wages; outdoor 
relief. 
1824 Vagrancy 
Act. Restricted 
relief to able-
bodied, penalised 
refusal to work by 
criminal hard 
labour sentence. 
1831 Reduction of 
minimum wage 
 
 
 
1834 Poor Law 
Amendment Act. 
Enshrines principal 
of less eligibility. 
Workhouse only  
1844 Outdoor 
Prohibitory Order 
– proscribing relief 
where workhouse 
an alternative. 
1847 General 
Consolidating 
Order. Whole 
family sent to 
workhouse, 
separately 
housed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1842 Introduction of Income 
Tax, where income is self-
assessed, and undifferentiated 
in source, applying only to 
middle and upper classes. 
1850 Growth of short 
time hirings for 
time-based 
wages 
 
Decline of 
internal 
contracting. 
Railways 
and Canals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growing 
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Growth of 
collectively 
bargained wages 
 
 
1870- 1880s 
Depression 
 
Introduction of 
sliding scale 
wages, with time 
rates based on 
market price in 
steel and iron, 
then coal trades, 
through the TU 
conciliation 
boards. 
Persistent of 
mixed system of 
price and time 
for internal 
subcontracting in 
cloth industry. 
Growth of 
vertical 
integration. 
 
 
 
Growth of 
the joint 
stock 
company 
and 
separation 
of 
ownership 
and control 
(60 
companies 
1885, 600 
1907) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1871 Trade Union Act 
and Criminal Law 
Amendment Act begin 
the establishment of 
collective bargaining 
protections and 
‘collective laisser-
faire.’ 
1875 Employers and 
Workmen Act: partial 
contractualisation, but 
retention of 
magistrates’ 
disciplinary powers. 
Protection of Property 
Act dismantled the 
Master and Servant 
Act criminality of 
breach of contract. 
1880 Employers’ 
Liability Act 
Emergence of the 
Employer-employee 
relationship  
1897 Workmens’ 
Compensation Act – 
divides salaried post-
holders from 
‘servants’ (e.g bus 
drivers..) 
 
 
 
 
 
1860s 12-15% 
paupers in 
workhouses.  
1869 Local 
Government 
Board privatisation 
of relief to Charity 
Organisation 
society, restricting 
relief to ‘deserving 
poor’. 
1880s 20%   ditto 
1900 30%   ditto 
 
 
 
 
 
Falling rates of indirect 
taxation, increasing rates of 
direct taxation. 
 
1894 Death duties with a 
graduated tax, distinction 
between precarious and 
spontaneous incomes, later to 
become active or inactive 
property. 
costs of 
education, 
and public 
health 
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1900 Decline of pure 
piece rate wages 
Generalisation of 
open-ended 
employment on 
time-based hiring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bedeaux systems 
of time x 
productivity. 
 1906 Trades Disputes 
Act provided unions 
with legal immunities 
and established rights 
to closed shops. 
Devonald v Rosser 
1906 mutuality of 
obligation in contract 
of employment 
Hanley v Pease 1915 
enforcement of 
reciprocality of 
exchange, taking 
discipline out. 
Simmons v Rosser 
1910 emergence of 
the control test for 
employment status 
1911 National 
Insurance Act : 
manual employees 
gradually all brought 
under one umbrella – 
excluding casual 
workers, women 
outworkers, salaried 
above £160 pa. 
Booth (1887) and 
Rowntree (1897) 
reports on poverty 
of working poor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1911 National 
Insurance Act. 
Institution of the 
male breadwinner 
model wage. 
Redefines 
unemployment in 
terms of suitable 
employment 
1920 
Unemployment 
Insurance Act 
increased 
coverage from 4 
to 12 million. 
1925 Widows’, 
Orphans’ and Old 
Age Contributory 
Pensions, 
consolidates 
retirement to 
define labour 
supply. 
1927 
Unemployment 
1906 Abandonment of active 
versus inactive property as 
basis of taxation in favour of 
earned and unearned income. 
1909 People’s budget, 
introducing land taxes and 
graduated death duties. 
 
1901-1913 Standard rate 
income tax @ 5% 
 
 
 
 
 
1911 Act. Regressive flat rate 
scheme, combined with 
indirect tax on beer and 
tobacco. 
1916-19 Threshold lowered to 
treble taxed individuals from 
1.13 to 3.9m by 1919. 
Standard rate income tax 
@30% 
Excess Profits Tax 1914-1920, 
then Corporation Tax. 
1919 Income tax extended to 
upper manual strike – but 
withdrawn after tax strikes. 
1922 Finance Act created the 
binary divide between 
employees (Class E) and self-
employed (Class D). 
1925 Budget ‘new fiscal 
constitution’: child tax 
1900 
13.3% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1937 
26% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Postwar 
construction, 
raising of the 
school 
leaving age 
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Insurance Act 
mitigates 
contributory 
actuarial principle, 
allowing 
intragenerational 
transfers of rights 
 
allowances for middle class 
families. Assessment of tax 
switched from lay 
commissioners to Inland 
Revenue, although individual 
returns on quarterly basis. 
Income assessed in single 
return for earned and 
unearned income, and super-
tax. 
1929 Budget decisive shift to 
centralised government 
spending, and on progressive 
income tax for welfare 
spending. 
1930 Labour budget, 
increased targeting of high 
earnings and unearned 
income. 
1931 National govt budget, 
lowering of thresholds, a 
further 1.2 million included in 
income tax. 
1945   Beveridge Report 
1945 
National Insurance 
Act 1946. 
Enshrinement of the 
employment contract, 
creation of the binary 
divide of employment 
and self-employment 
1946 National 
Insurance Act 
defines rights to 
benefits under 
universal social 
citizenship – but 
gendered on male 
breadwinner 
model. 
1942. Introduction of general 
income tax on a PAYE basis., 
covering 16 million 
employees. 
1948 
37% 
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4 THE MASTER-SERVANT NEXUS 
A useful, if arbitrary, starting point is the series of Master and Servant Acts marking the middle 
of the eighteenth century. These were the framing legislation of the employment relation, a 
‘statutory innovation’ (Deakin and Wilkinson, 62), establishing the master-servant model as 
the enabling law for labour markets of industrialisation. As far as the statute book is 
concerned, they remained largely unaltered for a century, until the next phase of major 
employment law legislation in the 1870s. By using the Weberian term ‘enabling’ law (Weber, 
1978), it is being suggested that these laws were constitutive of multiple economic 
transactions over an historic period, in this case that combined the practice of yearly or 
extended hiring, and an assumption, expressed forcefully by Blackstone towards the end of the 
18th century, that the master had a responsibility for the upkeep of the servant in good times 
and bad. In Swedberg’s (2003) or Hodgson’s (2007) terms, the laws were constitutive of the 
organisation of exchange as an economic activity, rather than a regulatory epiphenomena. 
They were also prescribed and enforced by the breach, and, significantly, by the powers of 
magistrates in criminal courts.  
Moreover, associated to yearly hiring was the right of settlement in the location (parish) where 
the work was undertaken, eventually leading to a right of parish relief in the new parish. In 
this respect, the Master and Servant Acts were institutionally buttressed by much earlier, 
indeed Elizabethan Poor Relief Act (1601), supplemented by Settlement Acts of the late 17th 
century, the 1722 Poor Relief Act Workhouse Test Act, and 1782 Poor Law Relief Act. These 
obliged the ‘welfare’ institutions to provide poor relief to those dependent on wages, relief that 
was resourced from a taxation regime of rates raised locally on property owners. Following 
enclosure legislation, and the growth in agricultural productivity, this historical nexus of 
employment law, welfare and fiscal systems enabled a controlled internal migration, and, as 
Deakin and Wilkinson argue, facilitated the emergence of industrial wage labour. England was 
the only country in Europe to possess such an arrangement, a locally administered but 
nationally integrated system, where welfare costs amount to between 1 and 2% of GDP, seven 
times that of France.  
Within the logic of legal evolution, the Master and Servant Acts were both an extension and a 
deviation from earlier legislation – no radical or conspicuous rupture. Aspects of the master-
servant model manifested continuity with the journeyman-apprentice model of the Statute of 
Artificers, but into new areas of economic activity unregulated by the corporative control of 
guilds, or wage assessment by magistrates.2 Indeed, these older forms continued to exist in 
parallel until their abolition in the early 19th century, even if becoming increasingly 
marginalised in their ‘enablement’ of economic activity. Their scope was progressively 
undermined by legal changes – notably the Combination Acts of the mid- and late-18th century 
– which proscribed fixing of wages and prices, and collective organisations controlling labour 
markets to that purpose. 
Yet, although constitutive of some aspects of the economic reality of employment relations, 
other aspects or economic organisation were certainly less framed by this legislation. In 
particular, many of the new areas of factory and workshop economic activity were 
characterised by forms of ‘internal contracting’, and a division between price work for the 
masters, and a combination of wage and subsistence for servants and wages alone labourers. 
The factory owners were not employers, and in some cases, merely leased out the use of 
factory space and machinery (Hudson, 2004; Mokyr, 2002). In others, the owners were main 
contractors to masters acting as internal sub-contractors. As has been widely commented, this 
system of piece-work was in many ways little more than bringing outworkers under one roof. 
Indeed, as an economic organisation piecework was almost akin to an internal commodity 
market, rather than labour market, especially given that prices paid in this internal market 
were often scaled to price shifts in external commodity markets. So, with internal contracting, 
whether by head of household, master, or ganger in the butty system, the sub-contractor was 
the engager of labour. A great variety of different combinations of piece work and more 
                                           
2 The 1562 Statute of Artificers, and the 1631 Book of Orders, controlling guild membership, wage and price fixing. 
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subordinate time based wages coexisted. Indeed, an important economic division, predicated 
on but not prescribed by, the Master and Servant Acts, was that between the piecework 
master and the wage-work servant or labourer. As will be discussed further, piece work is a 
distinctively instituted process of exchange, characterised by modes of evaluation and price 
scales peculiar to each industry. It is payment for the output of labour, rather than payment 
for employment, and fluctuations in price are directly influenced by commodity markets, rather 
than supply side features of labour markets. As an economic ‘institution’ it persisted to the end 
of the nineteenth century and, although with diminishing significance, beyond. Indeed, it 
outlasted the Master-Servant-Settlement-Poor Relief nexus by many decades. With price work 
at the core of factory organisation, and for so long, it is scarcely surprising that much 
engagement of labour escaped the employment form. Before considering the progressive 
although lengthy demolition of this nexus, therefore, it is worth emphasising an analytical 
difference between the constitutive or enabling aspect of a legal frame and an adaptive or 
congruent aspect, with respect to an economic environment. In the first aspect, it is difficult to 
consider a legally framed economic practice of master-servant engagements as their own 
selection environment, precisely because the law is endogenous to the practice. In the second 
aspect, it can be argued that the Master and Servant Acts were adapted to, rather than 
constitutive of, internal contracting and the piece-work system. Identifying these two aspects 
already suggests a more differentiated analysis of the interaction between law and economy. 
Turning now to the process of change of this mid-18th century nexus, two sources of change 
progressively undermined the Master-Servant model in the long road to an alternative nexus 
centred around the employment contract. A key ‘source of variation’ was the Speenhamland 
reform of the welfare regime. A second, clearly related change in economic organisation, 
involved the decline of long-term contracts in existing industries and the emergence of new 
industries that never experienced yearly hiring. This progressively undermined the 
organisation of exchange instituted by the Master and Servant Acts, especially the principal of 
reciprocity involved in the durability of the employment relation through thick times and thin. 
And there is possibly a third source of variation, waiting, as it were, in the wings – the salarial 
form of engagement of the middle class. We briefly consider each of these in turn. 
In 1795, reacting to the increasing rate-burden of numbers receiving outdoor relief – a stress 
between the fiscal and welfare institutions of the old order – magistrates in Speenhamland 
introduced a form of minimum wage guarantee, fixing wages to a level indexed to the price of 
bread. The aim was to reduce numbers dependent on relief, by increasing numbers dependent 
on wages, even if these were subsidised by the rates. Moreover the wage was adjusted for the 
number of household dependents: more loaves for more household members. Summarising, 
the effect of these new rules remained minimal during the boom years of relatively high wages 
and employment up to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. But then, with poor harvests, high 
bread prices, and economic depression, the impact became considerable. Speenhamland rules 
were seen to have the perverse effect of depressing wages further, as employers benefited 
from subsidisation by rate payers, without diminishing relief-dependency of the unemployed. 
These can be seen as ‘unintended consequences’ of the Speenhamland reform, which, in 
economic terms, rapidly became unsustainable, ultimately leading to the radically new regime 
of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act. 
Speenhamland highlights some significant points of analytic interest for evolutionary 
explanation. On the one hand, as a mode of instituting economic processes, welfare reform 
contrasts with the legal forms framing the organisation of engagement, typical of the Master 
and Servant Acts, but also of later reforms. By regulating quantitative, rather than qualitative, 
dimensions of economic activity, the rules directly transform resource flows, in this case of 
both wage transactions in labour markets and taxation leading to transfers from ratepayers to 
employers and wage earners. The ‘unintended consequences’ arise precisely because the rules 
interact with other changes in resource flows occurring within the economy – volume of cereal 
production, rate of employment, etc. As occurred in this case, this type of interaction can 
produce, quite contingently, a crisis in resource flows, an economic crisis of a kind that could 
not be encountered by the legal framing mode of instituting economic processes. 
Speenhamland rules were therefore a ‘mutation’ that met with quite rapid de-selection (a 
‘freak’ that did not last long), but, unlike biological evolution, also triggered and conditioned 
the subsequent institution of a quite dramatically different welfare resource regime. 
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The second source of erosion of the master-servant nexus was the growth of shorter term 
hiring, both in agriculture and in new industries, and a consequential disjuncture between 
hiring and settlement – that is, between wage dependency and rights to relief. Furthermore, 
shorter-term hiring relaxed the duty on the master to continuously employ servants in good 
times and bad. ‘Exceptive hiring’, hiring outside the normal rules, spread to include not only 
newly emerging areas of employment, such as mining and mill-working, but areas of working 
governed by fixed and regular hours of working, outside of which the servant was not at the 
behest of the master. In short, the Master and Servant Acts were gradually becoming 
incongruent with, or mal-adapted to, their economic environment, and the framing was also 
less ‘constitutive’ of normal economic practices of engagement of labour. But this selective 
pressure was very slow to induce major legislative change. This again points to differences in 
the nature of interactions between law and economy, and welfare rules and the economy. 
Finally, although very much waiting in the wings of history, a major division within in 
employment was between industrial and manual workers, covered by the Master and Servant 
Acts, and ‘office holders’, who were excluded from its provisions, yet whose terms of 
engagement approximated much more closely to the open-ended employment contract. This 
division was further reinforced by judicial decisions,3 one which categorised governesses, for 
example, as office holders, as against higher ranks of domestic servants. It was a social 
categorisation splitting the ranks of the employed that persisted in law well into 20th century. 
Limitations of managerial prerogative, mutuality of obligation, appropriateness of duties, 
disciplinary codes, all served to create a separate form of employment for middle class 
professions. It could be argued that these differences entrenched within statutory and case law 
formed a barrier to legal change bringing about a general form employment contract. We shall 
shortly examine its implications for the fiscal regime that began to emerge in mid-19th century. 
5 THE MID-CENTURY REFORM OF WELFARE 
Reviewing these three processes of erosion of the force of the Master and Servant Acts and 
their ‘hold’ over the economy, it seems clear that welfare reform and the resultant ‘rule failure’ 
of Speenhamland had by far the greatest and more immediate impact. In other words, it was 
more the interaction between welfare reform and legislative reform that destabilised the latter, 
than the direct interaction of law with its economic environment. In short, we need to begin to 
build a model of multiple interactions between our four poles of variation, and interactions 
between interactions. 
The decline of linkage between rights to relief (by settlement) and hiring, and the 
Speenhamland debacle, combined no doubt with the emergent political-economy ideology of 
free markets, resulted in a series of measures culminating in the 1834 Poor Law Amendment 
Act, further buttressed by a sequence of later measures. These measures were undoubtedly as 
much ‘constitutive law’ with respect to the instituting of labour markets, as the Master and 
Servant Acts which remained on the statute books. In addition to the master-servant 
engagement model, they enforced a new social division, detaching all connection between 
wages and relief, between the deserving and undeserving poor. Only the non-able bodied were 
to be entitled to outdoor relief, whereas all able-bodied, including eventually their dependents, 
were to be placed in workhouses in conditions that were required to be worse (“less eligible”) 
than the standard and quality of living than afforded by wage dependent labour at the lowest 
market rates.4 Outdoor relief – benefits in cash to the unemployed – were to be progressively 
reduced or eliminated. Labour tests on ability to work provided a further instrument for 
reducing rights to outdoor, cash, welfare benefits. 
The central aspect of this new legal framework, and the feature that made it constitutive of 
labour markets, was essentially the legal instruments enforcing labour market participation. It 
could not be left to a ‘purely economic’ choices of starve or work and calculations of utility 
maximisation. The 1824 Vagrancy Act which preceded and heralded the Poor Law Amendment 
Act, indeed compelled all able bodied people to find waged work, or be legally compelled to 
                                           
3 E.g. Lowther v. Radnor, 1806; Todd v Kerrich, 1852. 
4 Workhouses were forced labour regimes, without pay, in which eventually the whole household of the non-able would 
be placed, with families separated into separate groups defined by sex, and age.  
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one month’s hard labour. Males who deserted their families, if they became relief dependent, 
were also subject to criminal prosecution, with a penalty of three month’s hard labour. By 
legally instituting the constraint to exchange – the ‘duty to work’ – , by re-categorising the 
eligible to ‘welfare’ from the ineligible, and by incarcerating the unemployed able bodied, the 
new legal framework established the ‘freedom from interference’ within the market exchange 
between masters and servants. It formally instituted the zone of market freedom, defining the 
respective rights, in a way that dovetailed with previous Master and Servant Acts. As the 1834 
Poor Law Report expressed it: 
“Let the master and servant make their bargain without interference, 
direct or indirect, of a law of scale of maintenance.” 
Even the most formally free market in terms of price-setting was therefore instituted by law, 
and enforced by the use of state criminal powers. Moreover, as a welfare law, it was far from 
cost free, but mobilised resources largely through property taxes. By the time of the 
Depression of the 1870s and 1880s, workhouses had spread throughout the land, and 
increasing percentages of the poor lived within their walls. As a welfare-law regime it had to 
work as an economy of resources, and this was severely exposed for its deficiencies both by 
Depression itself, and by the Booth (1887) and Rowntree (1897) Reports. Although not as 
spectacularly as Speenhamland, the poor law regime was proving economically unsustainable 
by the time the economic environment it inhabited had also so changed in character as to 
destabilise it further (MacKinnon, 1987). 
For, the mid-19th century labour market institutionalisation was legally framed not by an 
employment versus unemployment dichotomy, rather by an able-bodied versus non-able 
bodied, or manual employable versus unemployable divisions. Moreover, because the Poor Law 
was essentially framing the master/able-bodied servant-wage labour relationship, and not the 
master/factory owner, let alone employer/the professional salaried employee relationships, 
there was no general legal framing of employment -  or unemployment.  
Before leaving this period of great reform, two further institutional innovations were 
introduced, both of which inhabited a fairly restricted niche economic environments at the 
time, which, in each case were eventually to dominate the landscape if in considerably 
changed form. The first was a significant piece of ‘enabling’ law, the establishment of limited 
liability joint stock companies as a legal entity, by the Acts of 1844 and 1856. Large scale 
enterprises in railways and canals were relatively small in number, if economically high in 
profile. These enterprises pioneered the development of vertical integration, extension of 
employment relations, and separation of ownership from management. But only in the late 
19th century did such enterprise rapidly expand in number, and become more typical of the 
demand side for labour. There were only 60 as late as 1885, growing rapidly, partly as a 
consequence of mergers and acquisitions, to 600 in 1900. 
Secondly, there was the introduction of income tax in 1842, reinforcing the social division 
noted above, because only applying to the middle and upper classes. It was, however, a 
markedly new fiscal handle, compared with property value taxes or customs and excise, upon 
which the fiscal-military state had been based (Daunton, 2002; O’Brien and Hunt, 1999). 
Income, however, was not only the bundle of all types of income, from professional salaries or 
office post-holding certainly, but also from rent, and profits. Income was total income, 
undifferentiated into its component parts, and it was self-assessed, with no requirement to 
identify its various sources. Moreover, it was policed by a kind of peer-review system, with like 
minded tax commissioners approving the self-assessment at the local level. It marked only the 
incipient emergence, subject to major alterations, of a tax on waged income. And, just as the 
open-ended employment form first took roots in the salaried middle class, this was also the 
niche environment for the first tax on salaried income. Both joint stock legislation and income 
tax, therefore, emphasise the importance of not treating ‘the economy’ as a homogeneous 
selection environment. And in both cases, it must be emphasised that they were subject to 
contingent and major transformation: to avoid any hint of teleological explanation, they did 
not have future history encoded in their genes. 
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6 THE EMERGENCE OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP/CONTRACT 
NEXUS. 
It will already be evident that the emergence of a contract based employment in industrial 
capitalism was a slow and tortuous one, involving the interweaving of legal, welfare, fiscal 
rules. The interaction between our four evolutionary poles has already been shown to be 
complex, and this is yet more evident in the period that saw the final emergence of a new 
nexus around the generalised employment relationship. During this final phase, lasting from 
the late nineteenth century to 1945, there were many asynchronies, conflicts and 
incoherencies between the four poles, suggesting highly complex dynamics.  
From the standpoint of economic organisation, the disappearance of internal contracting and 
the emergence of unified employment under managerial control was slow and varied from 
industry to industry. It is worth returning to the significance of piece-work, as a distinctively 
economically instituted economic process, in blocking the development of generalised 
employment. The price for piece mechanism characteristic of textile mills ensured the 
persistence of the division between masters as the non-employed independent subcontractors 
and their employed servants and labourers right up to the end of the 19th century (Biernacki, 
1995). Complex compendiums of prices for different types of cloth, with different kinds of 
yarns, with different qualities, subject to continuous revisions with technical changes, and price 
fluctuations in end markets, were evidence of non-legal, yet elaborate economic 
institutionalisation. Nothing illustrates the distinctiveness of this institution, than the fact that 
time was not a measure of employment under the master contracts of engagement, 
particularly in England. Instead, the working day was enforced by locking workers (master and 
servants) in and out of the factory, closing the gate when work commenced, opening it when 
work finished. As a disciplinary institution, it was extrinsic to legal instruments of engagement 
and to economically instituted price mechanisms. The erosion and replacement of piece work 
for employment on a time basis was thus critical in terms of economic organisation for 
changing the economic environment. A key element to the generalisation of employment 
based wages was undoubtedly the development of ‘collective laisser-faire’ wage bargaining 
between national federations of employers and trades union. Such bargaining, facilitated by 
the dismantling of the Combination Acts first by the 1871 Trade Union Act, and Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, and subsequently by the 1875 Conspiracy and Property Protection Act that 
provided legal immunities to trades unions, led to the new wage scales.  The emergence of 
general trades unions – as against craft unions – particularly broke the basis of master-servant 
divisions of terms of employment.  But just as the old Poor Law had enabled but not prescribed 
the price bargain between master and servants, so the new facilitation of collective bargaining 
left it to the parties of the exchange to generate the new institutional forms of labour market 
pricing. During the interwar period, the growth of the new industries and the demise of 
domestic service resulted in a further dramatic shift from servant status into hourly-waged 
factory employment, widely perceived as liberation from permanent subordination 
(Glucksmann, 1990). Taylorism, ‘scientific management’ and the Bedeaux systems of payment 
in factory-based industries, introduced new price mechanisms which linked output to time, 
with generalised techniques for measuring productivity. 
If these changes in economically instituted exchange processes were no doubt uneven in their 
impact, changes in law responding to this shifting environment followed their own legal, path-
dependent, and piecemeal patterns of mutation. The dismantlement of the Master and Servant 
Acts by the 1875 Employers and Workmen Act, and subsequent legislation defining the 
reciprocal obligations between employers and employees, persisted in excluding salaried post-
holders in their regulatory framing. In what today would seem a bizarre anomaly, for example, 
busdrivers were excluded from the provisions of employers’ liability to employees by virtue of 
being considered independently responsible salaried post-holders. A series of case law 
judgements gradually extended the legal test of being subject to managerial control as proof of 
employee status. But this fell far short of a general legal status of employee for all those 
engaged on a salaried basis within an integral organisation, private or public. Eventually, 
during the interwar period, case law also began to establish a test on whether someone could 
be deemed to be in a contract of service, or indeed to be in a business on own account, under 
a contract for services. But, these tests, in typical case law evolutionary mode, accrued, layer 
upon layer, rather than establishing a system of rules with the force of statute (Deakin and 
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Morris, 1995). The more comprehensive recategorisations instituting employment contracts as 
a general form came from elsewhere. 
As Deakin and Wilkinson argue, the changing welfare regime of the late 19th and early 20th 
century breaking with the Poor Law Act, were central to the establishment of the employment 
contract in the modern sense of contractual bargain. The economic emergence of generalised, 
continuous employment, was accompanied by a change in welfare rules making three 
innovative institutions constructing the boundaries of employment, in effect re-constituting the 
size and shape of the labour force on the supply-side: the growth of universal education 
regulated by progressive increases in the school leaving age, affecting the point of entry to 
labour markets; retirement, affecting the point of exit from labour markets; and the novel 
institution of unemployment. From the Factory Acts onwards, but especially with the late 19th 
century Education Acts, there was a reduction of child labour and a converse increase in state 
expenditure on education. A critical break, brought about by the 1908 Pension Act, aimed to 
divide the aged poor, from the non-able bodied and relief dependent. For those over 65, 
pensions replaced relief, as a matter of right.  
Finally, the introduction of a national insurance based contributory resource from 1911, with 
successive reforms through to 1927, progressively extended the range and scope of the 
employed covered by insurance, thereby linking unemployment to employment. From the 
standpoint of creating the new employment relation nexus, insurance regulation, much more 
than case or statutory law, gradually moved towards a general category of employee, from a 
base of manual workers, it progressively included salaried non-manual, women, and casual 
workers. As a further instrument for controlling supply of labour, and redefining the 
employment and wage relation, the 1911 Act instituted a strong set of rules for a male-
breadwinner model, with differential rates and rights for married women. 
But of all the three regulatory poles, the radical change occurred in the fiscal constitution, and, 
out of synch with the other two, it was to create the binary divide, at least in principle, 
between employed and self-employed, with attendant rights over resources, well ahead of law 
and welfare regimes. No doubt this was primarily driven by a change in the nature, as well as 
growth, of state expenditure. From being primarily a military-security-fiscal state, with 
revenues flat-lining at around 10% of GDP, punctuated only by peaks of National Debt driven 
by war expenditures, the state’s primary expenditures progressively expanded to support 
education, health, and infrastructure expenditures. A step-change took place in the amount of 
GDP channelled through the taxation system, with the construction of new collective rights to 
public resources. These were to be centrally established around income tax. From the early 
20th century, a crucial difference emerged in fiscal handles between earned and unearned 
income, the latter already pioneering, with death duties, a graduated progressive form of 
taxation. During the First World War years, an increasing proportion of the middle class 
population were subject to income tax, although, in the immediate post-war period attempts to 
extend it to the upper-working class were successfully resisted. The extension required a break 
with local, self-assessment, and regular continuous salaried wages, relatively unfluctuating, 
provided an effective handle for taxation, to enable centrally collected. Critically, the 1922 
Finance Act, well ahead of other regulatory modes, created the binary divide between one 
class of income tax payers (Class E) embracing in principle all employed wage earners, and the 
self-employed, deemed to be taxed on profits of their trade. In the period leading up to the 
second world war, the logic of this division was extended to embrace wider and wider sections 
of the working population. Major economic instabilities and fiscal crises of the state, notably 
the Great Depression, undoubtedly drove forward many of the regulatory changes, even if the 
‘economic environment’ was itself markedly riven by uneven development. Finally, in 1942, the 
PAYE system of income tax was applied to all wage earners, covering 16 million employees. 
Relative coherence and systematisation between the different regulatory modes was finally 
instituted through the Beveridge Reforms, and especially the 1946 National Insurance Act. The 
binary divide was fully integrated with the instruments regulating the supply-side of the labour 
force, and the legal status of employee. The employment relation nexus of law, fiscality, and 
welfare was both constitutive of, and congruent with, the dominant forms of economic 
organisation of waged labour and employment. But, the nexus was only a consequence of a 
long-drawn out, highly contingent process. This schematic account of the four nodes of 
evolutionary variation and interaction is evidence of the different modalities of change 
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governing each of them. As a consequence, asynchronies, – and from a backward looking 
perspective - inconsistencies and conflicts as much between the three regulatory nodes as 
between any of them and an uneven economic environment, were critical to the overall 
evolutionary process. Law developed to a different rhythm, and was differently ‘selected’, for 
example, from the rhythm of fiscal change, where budgetary crisis, even yearly budgetary 
balances, surpluses and deficits, were critical drivers of regulatory change. I now turn to draw 
some more general theoretical conclusions for the adequacy of different explanatory accounts. 
7 INSTITUTED OR EMBEDDED, EVOLUTIONARY OF COMPLEX OPEN 
SYSTEMS CAUSALITY? 
This review of Deakin and Wilkinson and Daunton provides powerful evidence for the specificity 
of legal, welfare and fiscal innovation. They inhabit different institutional logics – the 
separation of justice from the executive, the role of courts and judicial decisions ensure that 
the modalities of innovation are quite different from those of welfare reform, which in turn are 
different from fiscal innovation and the budgetary functions of the state. Law, welfare 
regulation and fiscal rules are distinctive sources of variation. 
The systematic comparison over the course of two centuries also sustains their arguments that 
the changing economic environment is also a source of variation on its own account, to which 
the three regulatory modes respond, if in different ways. There is less clear evidence that the 
law, for example, responds by translating informal codes emergent in the economy into formal 
codes, much stronger evidence that formal law, and its modes of enforcement, provide framing 
and classifying codes that homogenise otherwise quite disparate and diffuse patterns of 
economic behaviour – as with the Master and Servant Acts, for example. In that sense, it could 
be argued that the law is a selection environment for the economy, just as much as the 
reverse – but I come back to that. Welfare and fiscal rules, on the other hand, institute new 
rights over resources, impacting on economic flows of resources in quite a direct manner, and 
so in reverse, are subject to crises of reproduction, if, as is to be generally expected, 
economies behave in unexpected ways. The crises in funding pension regimes in the 
contemporary period, or fiscal crises of the state, are examples. 
However, the explanatory framework needs to become a bit more complex at this point. For, it 
is also clear from their accounts and the above analysis, that legal, welfare and fiscal rules 
effectively institute properly economic processes. In Swedberg’s or Hodgson’s sense, they are 
constitutive of at least key if partial aspects of the economies with which they are in 
interaction. In the case of legal statutory instruments they define the parties of the exchange, 
and their respective rights. In the case of welfare regulations also define and categorise the 
agents, but in addition the legal instruments channel flows of resources, or impel exchanges 
that would not otherwise take place. And finally in the case of taxation, new channels of 
resources are formed through their attachment by ‘fiscal handles’ to categorised resources, 
providing citizens with collective rights, to security, education, or other public goods provided 
by state organisations. These create non-market economies of resources. Many of the legal 
and welfare instruments we have been exploring, moreover, and from the 20th century, also 
the tax institutions are constitutive of economic processes at the centre of economic activity – 
the millions of transactions that take place in labour markets, for example. So, legally or 
welfare regulatory instituted economic processes are immanent in the economic environment, 
shaping it in significant ways. But, as we have also seen, they do so only partially. The 
institution of internal contracting or various price institutions of piecework or the wage rates of 
collective bargaining, intersect with, but fall outside the scope of formal state regulation. 
Earlier legislation had indeed instituted price mechanism – wage assessment by magistrates, 
for example. So, within the economy where formal state regulation ends, and economically 
instituted economic processes begins is an historically shifting outcome of the evolutionary 
process. From an evolutionary explanatory perspective, therefore, there are no sharp or fixed 
divides between the law as a source of variation and selection and the economy as source of 
variation and selection. The exogeneity or endogeneity of law and economy is relative and 
contingent.  
From this evidence, therefore, there is an important qualification to the Weberian concept of 
enabling law, if by that is meant a set of rules of the game that are preconditions for 
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subsequent operation of the economy – clarity of property rights, contract law, of whatever. 
The overwhelming picture from the historical account is one in which the formality of law 
emerges in mid-course of the development, consolidating and homogenising forms of economic 
activity, only for that formalisation to become subject to erosion and obsolescence, before a 
new set of formal rules emerge. There were aspects of the Master and Servant Acts that 
rapidly became out-of-synch with the operation of the labour market, even though other 
aspects continued to frame activity for most of the nineteenth century, before these too were 
finally superseded, to be replaced with new formal categorisations of employer and employee. 
This discussion brings us to the point where certain implications for the concept of 
embeddedness can usefully be drawn. The independent source of variation of the law relates to 
the political process of legal enactment, and the operations of the judicial system. These 
processes and operations are certainly non-economic. But they can, as we have seen, institute 
and frame the specifically economic processes of exchange, at least partially so. If 
embeddedness is taken to mean the relative indifferentiation between economic and non-
economic processes, the absorption of economic processes into social, political, cultural, or 
legal activities to a point where they become unidentifiable as economic, then embeddedness 
does not capture the relation between law and economy. Legal processes are both specific and 
interdependent with economic processes, and may institute specifically economic processes. 
The law is not absorbed into, or undifferentiated from, the economy, any more than the 
economy is absorbed into, or undifferentiated from the law. The issue of interest in an 
evolutionary account is precisely the point of intersection between formal legal processes of 
institution and economic processes of institution, of specifically economic processes. 
But the implied critique of embeddedness from this account goes much further as soon as the 
variety of regulatory modes is considered. We have seen the importance of distinguishing 
between legal, welfare and taxation modes of regulation, each exhibiting specific trajectories. 
Each has specific modes of interaction with the aspects of the economy. When describing the 
nexus between law, welfare, and taxation, there is evidence of overlapping and intersecting 
categorisations and rules that contingently combine together in shaping market exchanges. 
Historically, the very specificity of each of these regulatory modes was revealed in divergences 
and conflicts between their respective rule-systems, with one being out of synch with another, 
sometimes for extended historical periods. The interaction between different regulatory modes, 
as much as with the economy, is a critical aspect in understanding the process of historical 
transformation. An explanation of this kind therefore requires a multipolar conception – and 
here the analysis has arbitrarily privileged four – rather than de-differentiating one pole and 
another through the paradigm of embeddedness. The form of dynamic interaction we have 
been exploring can be graphically represented, where each of four poles have their own 
internal dynamics and trajectories, but in interaction and interdependence with the other 
three. The relationship and form of interaction, the boundaries and scope of institutionalisation 
of each of the poles, varies from one historical period to another. We have suggested that 
there was a long historical process of transition between one nexus of relationships between 
law, welfare, taxation and economic organisation and another (the Master-Servant nexus and 
the employment contract nexus), with long intervening periods of disjuncture and tension. 
Conflict and tension between the four poles forms a central element of the explanatory 
framework. A nexus is highly contingent, and any coherence is transitory and non-systemic. 
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This model can be viewed as a tool for thinking about explanatory frameworks. We have 
already suggested that the modes of interaction between each of the regulatory poles and the 
economy are differentiated, but as is suggested by the arrows, the interactions between the 
regulatory poles, how they occur, and in particular the political processes involved, suggest the 
need for much more reflection and historical examination. For example, the interconnection 
between taxation and welfare rules, because of their mobilisation and channelling of resources 
and the instituting of rights over them, undoubtedly generates a quite different dynamic than 
between either of these and law. For the sake of making the argument, each of the four poles 
has been taken to be homogeneous, internally integrated. Any account of the economy as a 
pole of interaction, as we have already suggested, requires a much more developed analysis of 
heterogeneity and unevenness, not just a generic concept of ‘the economy’. Indeed, Daunton’s 
concept of fiscal handle is one which could well be extended, and explored more. Identifying 
the changing points of attachment and interaction between law and welfare and emergent 
aspects of economic organisation, rather than the economies as a whole, may be an idea worth 
exploring. In this vein, it is worth highlighting how, the waged employment exchange of the 
mid-twentieth century labour market became a central institutional fulcrum to which each of 
these three regulatory modes  are co-attached only after a long process of historical 
development. It achieved this degree of salience and centrality only after two centuries of 
industrial capitalism, rather than being either the pre-eminent economic, legal, welfare or 
taxation pre-condition of its development. 
A final remark is called for concerning the use of the evolutionary metaphor of variation and 
selection. The above model and previous analysis suggested that each pole can be considered 
as both pole of variation and selection environment in relation to each of the others. Moreover, 
it was suggested that each of the regulatory poles were in some partial ways constitutive of 
their economic ‘environment’, and that the intense interactions occur within that ‘environment’ 
between regulatorily and economically instituted economic processes. This calls for a 
modification of the language of mutation and exogenous selection: the feedback processes are 
many and complex. Finally, because the dynamic involved in the model is multipolar, it may be 
that a language of complex, open-systems causality is more appropriate than one that implies 
a bi-polar dynamic or any straightforward opposition or dichotomy between variation and 
selection process.  
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